Dialectics of Counting and Measures of Rough Theories by Mani, A.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
2.
25
58
v1
  [
ma
th.
LO
]  
13
 Fe
b 2
01
1
DIALECTICS OF COUNTING AND MEASURES
OF ROUGH THEORIES
A. Mani
Calcutta Mathematical Society
9/1B, Jatin Bagchi Road
Kolkata-700029, India
Email: a.mani.cms@gmail.com
Home Page: http://www.logicamani.co.cc
NCETSC’2011, 2nd and 3rd Feb’2011, Nowrosjee Wadia College and Pune Univ., Pune, India
Abstract—New concepts of rough natural number systems,
recently introduced by the present author, are used to improve
most rough set-theoretical measures in general Rough Set theory
(RST) and measures of mutual consistency of multiple models of
knowledge. In this research paper, the explicit dependence on the
axiomatic theory of granules of [1] is reduced and more results
on the measures and representation of the numbers are proved.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rough and Fuzzy set theories have been the dominant
approaches to vagueness and approximate reasoning from a
mathematical perspective. In rough set theory (RST), vague
and imprecise information are dealt with through binary rela-
tions (for some form of indiscernibility) on a set or covers of
a set or through more abstract operators. In classical RST [2],
starting from an approximation space consisting of a pair of
a set and an equivalence over it, approximations of subsets of
the set are constructed out of equivalence partitions (these are
crisp or definite) that are also regarded as granules in many
senses. Most of the developments in RST have been within the
ZFC or ZF set-theoretic framework of mathematics. In such
frame works, rough sets can be seen as pairs of sets of the form
(A, B), with A ⊆ B or more generally as in the approaches
of the present author as collections of some sense definite
elements of the form {a1, a2, . . . an, b1, b2, . . . br} subject to
ais being ’part of’ of some of the bjs (in a Rough Y -system)
[1].
Relative RST, fuzzy set theory may be regarded as a
complementary approach or as a special case of RST from
the membership function perspective ( [3]). Hybrid rough-
fuzzy and fuzzy-rough variants have also been studied. In
these a partitioning of the meta levels can be associated for
the different types of phenomena, though it can be argued that
these are essentially of a rough set theoretic nature. All of these
approaches have been confined to ZFC or ZF or the setting
of classical mathematics. Exceptions to this trend include the
Lesniewski-mereology based approach [4]. Though Rough Y -
systems have been introduced by the present author in ZF
compatible settings [1], they can be generalised to semi-sets
and variants in a natural way. This semi-set theoretical variant
is work in progress.
Granules are essentially the building blocks of approxima-
tions in RST, but are more usually viewed from contextual
perspectives in the literature. As classical RST is generalised
to more general relations and covers, the process of con-
struction and definition of approximations becomes more open
ended and draws in different amounts of arbitrariness or hidden
principles. The relevant concept of ’granules’, the things that
generate approximations, may also become opaque in these
settings. To address these issues and for semantic compulsions
a new axiomatic theory of granules has been developed over a
RYS in [1] and other recent papers by the present author. This
theory has been used to formalize different principles including
the local clear discernibility principle in the same paper. In a
separate paper, it is extended to various types of general RST
and is used to define the concepts of discernibility used in
counting procedures, generalised measures and the problems
of representation of semantics.
Many types of contexts involving vagueness cannot be
handled in a elegant way through standard mathematical
techniques. Much of RST and FST are not known to be
particularly elegant in handling different measures like the
degree of membership or inclusion. For example these mea-
sures do not determine the semantics in clear terms or the
semantics do not determine the measures in a unique way. But
given assumptions about the measures, compatible semantics
( [5]) in different forms are well known. This situation is
due to the absence of methods of counting collections of
objects including relatively indiscernible ones and methods
for performing arithmetical operations on them. However in
various algebraic semantics of classical RST some boundaries
on possible operations may be observed.
The process of counting a set of objects given the restriction
that some of these may be indiscernible within themselves may
appear to be a very contextual matter and on deeper analysis
may appear to bear no easy relationship with any fine structure
concerning the vagueness of collection of such elements or
the rough semantics (algebraic or frame). This is reflected
in the absence of related developments on the relationship
between the two in the literature and is more due to the lack
of developments in the former.
In a recent research paper, theories of vague numbers or
rather procedures for counting collections of objects including
indiscernible ones have been introduced by the present author
and have been applied to extend various measures of RST.
The extended measures have better information content and
also supplement the mereological theory from a quantitative
perspective. Proper extension of these to form a basis of RST
within ZF/ZFC is also developed in the paper. Here, by a
’basis of RST’, I mean a theory analogous to the theory of
numbers from which all mathematics of exact phenomena can
be represented. All of this is based over an extended version
of my axiomatic theory of granules for RST [1].
In the present paper, the counting procedures and gen-
eralised measures are presented in a more accessible way
without explicit dependence on the the axiomatic granularity
theory and independent of the programme of mathematics
of vagueness. This is meaningful because the improvements
in the quality of measures is substantial and relevant in all
approaches. More results are also proved on the representation
of these new rough naturals.
In the second section, the basic orientation of object and
meta levels and some non-standard (with respect to the
literature on RST) examples are initially presented. In the
third subsection, aspects of counting in domains of vague
reasoning are explained. Dialectical counting processes are
introduced in the third section. These are used to generalise
rough inclusion functions, degrees of knowledge dependency
and other measures in the next section. Subsequently I examine
the problem of improving the representation of counts in some
detail in the fifth section.
A. SOME BACKGROUND
Some background is provided for convenience. In classical
RST, an approximation space (AS) is a pair S = 〈S, R〉,
with S being a set and R an equivalence relation over it.
The lower and upper approximation of an element A of the
power set ℘(S) are defined by Al =
⋃
{[x] : [x] ⊆ A} and
Au =
⋃
{[x] : [x]∩ A 6= ∅} with [x] denoting the equivalence
class generated by an element x ∈ S. Here the equivalence
classes function as granules. If R is replaced by a tolerance
relation T , then we get a tolerance approximation space (TAS).
Some references for extension of classical RST to TAS are [6],
[7] [8], [9] and [10]. Partial equivalences are used instead of
equivalences in esoteric RST [11].
The theory of Rough Orders [12] is a generalisation of rough
set theory. Let 〈B, ξ〉 be a pair with B = 〈B,≤〉 being a
bounded poset and ξ = 〈E,≤′〉 a bounded lattice with ≤′=
≤ ∩E2. 1B = 1ξ,0B = 0xi,then the pair is a rough order.
In a poset B, a self-map u is called a pre-closure or upper
approximation map if and only if u2 = u and ∀x, x ≤ u(x). A
pre-closure map v on the dual Bd = 〈B,≤′〉 is called a lower
approximation map. Some of the basic results of rough orders
include the if and only if condition for approximation maps to
be closure maps and the notions of degree of roughness. If ξ
and ξ are the ( [12]) lower and upper approximation operators
on 〈B, ξ〉 then any element x satisfying ξ(x) = x = ξ(x) is
an exact element and conversely.
Cover based RST can be traced to [13], where starting from
the cover {[x]T ;x ∈ S} the approximations Al and Au are
defined. A 1-neighbourhood [14] n(x) of an element x ∈ S is
simply a subset of S. The collection of all 1-neighbourhoods
N of S will form a cover if and only if (∀x)(∃y)x ∈ n(y)
(anti-seriality). So in particular a reflexive relation on S is
sufficient to generate a cover on it. Of course, the converse
association does not necessarily happen in a unique way. 1-
neighbourhoods can be used to investigate the relation between
many types of approximations that are definable using 1-
neighbourhoods. But there are examples of approximations
that do not fit into this general framework ( [1]).
General Rough Y-Systems (RYS+) and Rough Y-Systems
(RYS) were introduced in [1]. These are intended to capture
a minimal common fragment of most RSTs. The former is
more efficient due to its generality. Both RYS+ and RYS
can be seen as the generalization of the algebra formed on
the power set of the approximation space in classical RST
and rough orders. Pxy can be read as ’x is a part of y’ and
is intended to generalise inclusion in the classical case. The
elements in S may be seen as the collection of approximable
and exact objects - this interpretation is compatible with S
being a set. The description operator of FOPL ι is used in
the sense: ι(x)Φ(x) means ’the x such that Φ(x)’. It helps
in improving expression and given this the meta-logical ′,′
can be understood as ∧ (which is part of the language). The
description operator actually extends FOPL by including more
of the metalanguage and from the meaning point of view is
different, though most logicians will see nothing different. For
details, the reader may refer to [15].
Definition 1: A Rough Y System (RYS+) will be a tuple of
the form
〈S, W, P, (li)
n
1 , (ui)
n
1 , +, ·, ∼, 1〉
satisfying all of the following (P is intended as a binary
relation on S and W ⊂ S, n being a finite positive integer.
ι is the description operator of FOPL: ι(x)Φ(x) means ’the
x such that Φ(x) ’. ’,’ can be read as a ∧ or as ’and’ in the
meta language):
1) (∀x)Pxx ; (∀x, y)(Pxy, Pyx −→ x = y)
2) For each i, j, li, uj are surjective functions : S 7−→ W
3) For each i, (∀x, y)(Pxy −→ P(lix)(liy) ∧
P(uix)(uiy))
4) For each i, (∀x)P(lix)x ∧ P(x)(uix))
5) For each i, (∀x)(P(uix)(lix) −→ x = lix = uix)
The operations +, · and the derived operations
O, P, U, X, O will be assumed to be defined uniquely
as follows:
• Overlap: Oxy iff (∃z)Pzx ∧ Pzy
• Underlap: Uxy iff (∃z)Pxz ∧ Pyz
• Proper Part: Pxy iff Pxy ∧ ¬Pyx
• Overcross: Xxy iff Oxy ∧ ¬Pxy
• Proper Overlap: Oxy iff Xxy ∧ Xyx
• Sum: x+ y = ιz(∀w)(Owz ↔ (Owx ∨Owy))
• Product: x · y = ιz(∀w)(Pwz ↔ (Pwx ∧Pwy))
• Difference: x− y = ιz(∀w)(Pwz ↔ (Pwx ∧ ¬Owy))
• Associativity: We will assume that +, · are associative
operations and so the corresponding operations on finite
sets will be denoted by ⊕, ⊙ respectively.
Remark:
W can be dropped from the above definition and it can be
required that the range of the operations ui, lj are all equal
for all values of i, j.
Definition 2: In the above definition, if we relax the sur-
jectivity of li, ui, require partiality of the operations + and
·, weak associativity instead of associativity and weak com-
mutativity instead of commutativity, then the structure will be
called a General Rough Y-System (RYS). In formal terms, we
mean
• Sum1: x + y = ιz(∀w)(Owz ↔ (Owx ∨ Owy)) if
defined
• Product1: x · y = ιz(∀w)(Pwz ↔ (Pwx ∧ Pwy)) if
defined
• Weak Associativity: x⊕ (y ⊕ z) ω∗= (x⊕ y)⊕ z
and similarly for product. The weak equality A ω∗= B
for two terms A,B, essentially means if either side is
defined, then the other is and the two terms are equal.
• Weak Commutativity: x⊕ y ω∗= y ⊕ x; x · y ω∗= y · x
For more details on RYS, the reader is referred to [1]. RYS
can be naturally used to model collections of vague objects,
exact objects and others. In the present paper, the focus will
be on such collections and definable rough equalities. The
reference to other structure will be implicit and it is perfectly
possible to use the developed theory in the context of the other
mentioned theories.
In almost all applications, the collection of all granules G
forms a subset of the RYS S. But a more general setting can
be of some interest especially in a semi-set theoretical setting.
This aspect will be considered separately.
II. SOME EXPLANATION
In this section, some of the basic motivations, examples and
aspects of the context are explained. One advantage of RYS is
that it becomes possible to deal with sets of approximations of
objects, vague objects and other objects with no knowledge of
their ontology. In other words the evolution of the scenario
need not be fully known beforehand. The same applies to
contexts in which the general counting procedures would be
applicable. This necessitates some clarifications of the basic
relationship between object and meta levels.
In classical RST (see [2]), an approximation space is a
pair of the form 〈S, R〉, with R being an equivalence on
the set S. On the power set ℘(S) lower and upper approx-
imation operators, apart from the usual Boolean operations,
are definable. The resulting structure constitutes a semantics
for RST (though not satisfactory) in a classicalist perspective.
This continues to be true even when R is some other type
of binary relation. More generally (see fourth section) it
is possible to replace ℘(S) by some set with a parthood
relation and some approximation operators defined on it. The
associated semantic domain in the sense of a collection of
restrictions on possible objects, predicates, constants, functions
and low level operations on those will be referred to as
the classical semantic domain for general RST. In contrast
the semantics associated with sets of roughly equivalent or
relatively indiscernible objects with respect to this domain will
be called the rough semantic domain. Actually many other
semantic domains including hybrid semantic domains can be
generated (see [10], [16]–[18]) for different types of rough
semantics, but these two broad domains will always be. In one
of the semantics developed in [10], the reasoning is within the
power set of the set of possible order-compatible partitions
of the set of roughly equivalent elements. The concept of
semantic domain used is therefore similar to the sense in which
it is used in general abstract model theory [19].
Formal versions of these types of semantic domains will be
useful for clarifying the relation with categorical approaches
to fragments of granular computing [20]. But even without a
formal definition it can be seen that the two approaches are not
equivalent. Since the categorical approach requires complete
description of fixed type of granulations, it is difficult to
apply and especially when granules evolve relative particular
semantics or semantic domains. The entire category ROUGH
of rough sets in [20], assumes a uniform semantic domain
as evidenced by the notion of objects and morphisms used
therein. A unifying semantic domain may not also be definable
for many sets of semantic domains in our approach. This
means the categorical approach needs to be extended to
provide a possibly comparable setting.
The term object level will mean a description that can be
used to directly interface with fragments (sufficient for the
theories or observations under consideration) of the concrete
real world. Meta levels concern fragments of theories that
address aspects of dynamics at lower meta levels or the object
level. Importantly, we permit meta level aspects to filter down
to object levels relative a different object level specification.
So it is always possible to construct more meta levels and
expressions constructed in these can be said to carry intentions.
A. EXAMPLES
The examples in this section do not explicitly use informa-
tion or decision tables though all of the information or decision
table examples used in various RSTs would be naturally
relevant for the general theory developed. Here I will be laying
emphasis on demonstrating the need for many approximation
operators, choice among granules, different concepts of rough
equalities and conflict resolution.
Example-1:
Consider the following statements that can be associated
with the description of an apple kept in a plate on a table:
• Object is apple-shaped; Object has maroon colour
• Object has vitreous skin; Object has shiny skin
• Object has vitreous, smooth and shiny skin
• Green apples are not sweet to taste
• Object does not have coarse skin as some apples do
• Apple is of variety A; Apple is of variety X
Some of the individual statements like those about shape,
colour and nature of skin may be ’atomic’ in the sense that
a more subtle characterization may not be available. It is
also obvious that only some subsets of these statements may
consistently apply to the apple on the table. This leads to
the question of selecting some atomic statements over others.
But this operation is determined by consistency of all the
choices made. Therefore from a RST perspective, the atomic
statements may be seen as granules and then it would also
seem that choice among sets of granules is natural. More
generally ’consistency’ may be replaced by more involved
criteria that are determined by the goals. A nice way to see
this would be to look at the problem of discerning the object
in different contexts - discernibility of apples on trees require
different kind of subsets of granules.
Example-2:
In the literature on educational research [21] it is known
that even pre-school going children have access to powerful
mathematical ideas in a form. A clear description of such ideas
is however not known and researchers tend to approximate
them through subjective considerations. For example, consider
the following example from [21]:
Four-year-old Jessica is standing at the bottom of a small
rise in the preschool yard when she is asked by another four-
year-old on the top of the rise to come up to her.
• “No, you climb down here. Its much shorter for you.“
The authors claim that ”Jessica has adopted a developing
concept of comparison of length to solve at least for her the
physical dilemma of having to walk up the rise”. But a number
of other concepts like ’awareness of the effects of gravitational
field’, ’climbing up is hard’, ’climbing up is harder than
climbing down’, ’climbing down is easier’, ’climbing up is
harder’, ’others will find distances shorter’, ’make others do
the hard work’ may or may not be supplemented by linguistic
hedges like developing or developed and assigned to Jessica.
The well known concept of concept maps cannot be used
to visualize these considerations, because the concept under
consideration is not well defined. Of these concepts some will
be assuming more and some less than the actual concept used
and some will be closer than others to the actual concept used.
Some of the proposals may be conflicting, and that can be a
problem with most approaches of RST and fuzzy variants.
The question of one concept being closer than another may
also be dependent on external observers. For example, how
do ’climbing up is harder’ and ’climbing up is harder than
climbing down’ compare?
The point is that it makes sense to:
• accommodate multiple concepts of approximation and
rough equalities
• assume that subsets of granules may be associated with
each of these approximations
• assume that disputes on ’admissible approximations’ can
be resolved by admitting more approximations
It is these considerations and the actual reality of different
RST that are among the motivations for the definition of
Rough Y -systems.
B. OBJECTIVITY OF MEASURES AND GENERAL RST
In RST different types of rough membership and inclusion
functions are defined using cardinality of associated sets.
When fuzzy aspects are involved then these types of functions
become more controversial as they tend to depend on the
judgement of the user. Often these are due to attempts at
quantifying linguistic hedges. Further these types of functions
are also dependent on the way in which the evolution of
semantics is viewed. But even without regard to this evolu-
tion, the computation of rough inclusion functions invariably
requires one to look at things from a higher meta level - from
where all objects appear exact. In other words an estimate of a
perfect granular world is also necessary for such computations
and reasoning.
Eventually this leads to mix up of information obtained
from perceiving things at different levels of granularity. I find
all this objectionable from the point of view of rigour and
specific applications too. To be fair such a mix up seems to
work fine without much problems in many applications. But
that is due to the scope of the applications and the fact that
oversimplifications through the use of cardinality permits a
second level of ’intuitive approximation’.
C. NUMBERS AND THEIR GENERALIZATION
In the mathematics of exact phenomena, the natural numbers
arise in the way they do precisely because it is assumed that
things being counted are well defined and have exact existence.
When a concrete collection of identical balls on a table are
being counted, then it is their relative position on the table
that helps in the process. But there are situations in real life,
where
• such identification may not be feasible
• the number assigned to one may be forgotten while
counting subsequent objects
• the concept of identification by way of attributes may not
be stable
• the entire process of counting may be ’lazy’ in some
sense.
• the mereology necessary for counting may be insufficient.
Some specific examples of such contexts are:
• Direct counting of fishes in a lake is difficult and the
sampling techniques used to estimate the population of
fishes do not go beyond counting samples and pre-
sampling procedures. For example some fishes may be
caught, marked and then put back into the lake. Random
samples may be drawn from the mixed population to
estimate the whole population using proportion related
statistics. The whole procedure however does not involve
any actual counting of the population.
• In crowd management procedures, it is not necessary to
have exact information about the actual counts of the
people in crowds.
• In many counting procedures, the outcome of the last
count (that is the total number of things) may alone be
of interest. This way of counting is known to be sufficient
for many apparently exact mathematical applications.
• Suppose large baskets containing many varieties of a fruit
are mixed together and suppose an observer with less-
than-sufficient skills in classifying the fruits tries to count
the number of fruits of a variety. The problem of the
observer can be interpreted in mereological terms.
• Partial algebras are very natural in a wide variety of
mathematics. For example, in semigroup theory the set
of idempotents can be endowed with a powerful partial
algebraic structure. Many partial operations may be seen
to originate from failure of standard counting procedures
in specific contexts.
Though not usually presented in the form, studies of group
actions, finite and infinite permutation groups and related
automorphisms and endomorphisms can through light on lower
level counting. In the mathematics of exact phenomena, these
aspects would seem superfluous because cardinality is not
dependent on the order of counting. But in the context of the
present generalization somewhat related procedures are seen
to be usable for improving representation in the penultimate
section.
In counting collections of objects including relatively exact
and indiscernible objects, the situation is far more complex -
the first thing to be modified would be the relative orientation
of the object and different meta levels as counting in any sense
would be from a higher meta level. Subsequently the concept
of counting (as something to be realized through injective
maps into N ) can be modified in a suitable way. The eventual
goal of such procedures should be the attainment of order-
independent representations.
D. ROUGH EQUALITIES
Rough equalities of various types have been studied in the
literature. Typically they depend on one or more approxima-
tion operators for their definition. They can almost always be
seen to arise as Boolean combination of atomic equalities of
the the form if the approximation of two things are equal then
they are equivalent in a rough sense. In classical RST, two
subsets A,B of an approximation space S are roughly equal
if and only if Al = Bl and Au = Bu, that is if the two sets
are bottom- equal and top-equal [2]. In the theory of rough
orders, rough equalities can be defined in an analogous way.
In other RST, the number of useful rough equalities increase
in number. For example, in bitten rough set theory [10], as
many as six rough equalities are of interest. In RYS, many
more atomic equalities of interest can also be defined.
In the two examples above, the concept of discernibility
of objects or concepts can be naturally made to depend
on the selected attributes and this in turn induces related
indiscernibility. Also note that the relation may be a tolerance
that is not transitive.
III. DIALECTICAL COUNTING, MEASURES
To count a collection of objects in the usual sense it is
necessary that they be distinct and well defined. So a collection
of well defined distinct objects and indiscernible objects can
be counted in the usual sense from a higher meta level of
perception. Relative this meta level, the collection must appear
as a set. In the counting procedures developed, the use of this
meta level is minimal and certainly far lesser than in other
approaches. It is dialectical as two different interpretations
are used simultaneously to complete the process. These two
interpretations cannot be merged as they have contradictory
information about relative discernibility. Though the classical
interpretation is at a relatively higher meta level, it is still
being used in the counting process and the formulated counting
is not completely independent of the classical interpretation.
A strictly formal approach to these aspects will be part of a
forthcoming paper.
Counting of a set of objects of an approximation space
and that of its power set are very different as they have very
different kinds of indiscernibility inherent in them. The latter
possess a complete evolution for all of the indiscernibility
present in it while the former does not. Counting of elements
of a RYS is essentially a generalisation of the latter. In
general any lower level structure like an approximation space
corresponding to a 1-neighbourhood system ( [14]) or a cover
need not exist in any unique sense. The axiomatic theory of
granules developed in [1] provides a formal exactification of
these aspects.
Let S be a RYS, with R being a derived binary relation
(interpreted as a weak indiscernibility relation) on it. As
the other structure on S will not be explicitly used in the
following, it suffices to take S to be an at most countable set
of elements in ZF, so that it can be written as a sequence of the
form: {x1, x2, . . . , xk, . . . , }. Taking (a, b) ∈ R to mean ’a
is weakly indiscernible from b’ concepts of primitive counting
regulated by different types of meta level assumptions are
defined below. The adjective primitive is intended to express
the minimal use of granularity and related axioms.
Indiscernible Predecessor Based Primitive Counting (IPC)
In this form of ’counting’, the relation with the immediate
preceding step of counting matters crucially.
1) Assign f(x1) = 11 = s0(11)
2) If f(xi) = sr(1j) and (xi, xi+1) ∈ R, then assign
f(xi+1) = 1j+1
3) If f(xi) = sr(1j) and (xi, xi+1) /∈ R, then assign
f(xi+1) = s
r+1(1j)
The 2-type of the expression sr+1(1j) will be j. Successors
will be denoted by the natural numbers indexed by 2-types.
An alternative obvious way of writing IPC counts as sequences
would be
{(α(i), β(i))}i,
where the index i ranges over N , β(i) would be the 2-type
and α(i) is a 0 or a successor.
Proposition 1: Sequences of IPC of the form
{(α(i), β(i))}i satisfy all of the following (when the
quantities α(i), β(i)s are interpreted as natural numbers):
• (i < j, β(i) = β(j) −→ α(i) = α(j) + j − i)
• (i < j < k, β(i) = β(k) −→ β(i) = β(j))
History Based Primitive Counting (HPC)
In HPC, the relation with all preceding steps of counting
will be taken into account.
1) Assign f(x1) = 11 = s0(11)
2) If f(xi) = sr(1j) and (xi, xi+1) ∈ R, then assign
f(xi+1) = 1j+1
3) If f(xi) = sr(1j) and
∧
k<i+1(xk, xi+1) /∈ R, then
assign f(xi+1) = sr+1(1j)
In any form of counting in this section, if f(x) = α, then
τ(α) will denote the least element that is related to x, while
ǫ(α) will be the greatest element preceding α, which is related
to α.
History Based Perceptive Partial Counting (HPPC)
In HPPC, the valuation set shall be N ∪ {∗} = N∗ with ∗
being an abbreviation for ’undefined’.
1) Assign f(x1) = 1 = s0(1)
2) If (xi, xi+1) ∈ R, then assign f(xi+1) = ∗
3) If Maxk<if(xk) = sr(1) and
∧
k<i(xk, xi) /∈ R, then
assign f(xi) = sr+1(1)
Clearly, HPPC depends on the order in which the elements
are counted.
Indiscernible Predecessor Based Partial Counting (IPPC)
This form of counting is similar to HPPC, but differs in
using the IPC methodology.
1) Assign f(x1) = 1 = s0(1)
2) If (xi, xi+1) ∈ R, then assign f(xi+1) = ∗
3) If Maxk<if(xk) = sr(1) and (xi−1, xi) /∈ R, then
assign f(xi) = sr+1(1)
Definition 3: A generalised approximation space 〈S, R〉
will be said to be IPP Countable (resp HPP Countable) if
and only if there exists a total order on S, under which all the
elements can be assigned a unique natural number under the
IPPC (resp HPPC) procedure . The ratio of number of such
orders to the total number of total orders will be said to be
the IPPC Index (resp HPPC Index).
These types of countability are related to measures, applica-
bility of variable precision rough methods and combinatorial
properties. The counting procedures as such are strongly
influenced by the meaning of associated contexts and are
not easy to compare. In classical RST, HPC can be used to
effectively formulate a semantics, while the IPC method yields
a weaker version of the semantics in general. This is virtually
proved below:
Theorem 1: In the HPC procedure applied to classical RST,
a set of the form {lp, 1q, . . . 1t} is a granule if and only if it is
the greatest set of the form with every element being related
to every other and for any element α in it τ(α) = f⊣(lp)
and ǫ(α) = f⊣(1t) (for at least two element sets). Singleton
granules should be of the form {lp} with this element being
unrelated to all other elements in S.
Theorem 2: All of the following are decidable in a finite
number of steps in a finite AS by the application of the HPC
counting method :
1) Whether a given subset A is a granule or otherwise.
2) Whether a given subset A is the lower approximation of
a set B
3) Whether a given subset A is the upper approximation of
a set B.
Proof: Granules in the classical RST context are equiv-
alence classes and elements of such classes relate to other
elements within the class alone.
Theorem 3: The above two theorems do not hold in the IPC
context. The criteria of the first theorem defines a new type of
granules in totally ordered approximation spaces and relative
this the second theorem may not hold.
Proof: By the IPC way of counting, equivalence classes
can be split up into many parts and the numeric value may be
quite deceptive. Looking at the variation of the 2-types, the
criteria of the first theorem above will define parts of granules,
that will yield lower and upper approximations distinct from
the classical ones respectively.
Extension of these counting processes to TAS for the
abstract extraction of information about granules, becomes too
involved even for the simplest kind of granules. However if
the IPC way of counting is combined with specific parthood
orders, then identification of granules can be quite easy.
The other way is to consider entire collections of countings
according to the IPC scheme.
Theorem 4: Among the collection of all IPC counts of a
RYS S, any one with maximum number of 1is occurring in
succession determines all granules. If S is the power set of an
approximation space, then all the definite elements can also
be identified from the distribution of sequences of successive
1is.
Proof:
• Form the collection I(S) of all IPC counts of S
• For α, β ∈ I(S), let α  β if and only if β has longer
strings of 1i s towards the left and more number of strings
of 1is of length greater than 1, than α
• The maximal elements in this order suffice for this
theorem.
EXAMPLE
Let S = {f, b, c, a, k, i, n, h, e, l, g,m} and let R, Q be the
reflexive and transitive closure of the relation
{(a, b), (b, c), (e, f), (i, k), (l,m), (m,n), (g, h)}
and
{(a, b), (e, f), (i, k), (l,m), (m,n)}
respectively. Then 〈S, R〉 and 〈S, Q〉 are approximation
spaces. This set can be counted (relative R) in the presented
order as follows:
IPC {11, 21, 12, 13, 23, 14, 24, 34, 15, 25, 16, 26}
HPC {11, 21, 12, 13, 23, 14, 15, 25, 16, 17, 18, 19}
HPPC {11, 21, ∗, ∗, 31, ∗, 41, 51, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗}
HPC Relative Q: {11, 21, 31, 12, 22, 13, 23, 33,
14, 15, 25, 16}
The quotient
S|Q = {{a, b}, {c}, {e, f}, {i, k}, {l,m, n}, {g}, {h}}
and the positive region of Q relative R is
POSR(Q) =
⋃
X∈S|Q
X l = {e, f, l,m, n} = {f, n, e, l,m}
(in the order). The induced HPC counts of this set are
respectively
{11, 25, 16, 17, 19}
and
{11, 23, 14, 15, 16}.
IV. GENERALIZED MEASURES
According to Pawlak’s approach [2] to theories of knowl-
edge from a classical rough perspective, if S is a set of
attributes and R an indiscernibility relation on it, then sets
of the form Al and Au represent clear and definite concepts.
If Q is another stronger equivalence (Q ⊆ R) on S, then the
state of the knowledge encoded by 〈S, Q〉 is a refinement of
that of S = 〈S, R〉. The R-positive region of Q is defined to
be
POSR(Q) =
⋃
X∈S|Q
X lR ; X lR =
⋃
{[y]R; [y]R ⊆ X}.
The degree of dependence of knowledge Q on R δ(Q,R is
defined by
δ(Q,R) =
Card(POSR(Q))
Card(S)
.
Definition 4: The granular degree of dependence of knowl-
edge Q on R, gk(Q,R) will be the tuple (k1, . . . kr), with kis
being the ratio of the number of granules of type i included
in POSR(Q) to card(S).
Note that the order on S, induces a natural order on the
granules (classes) generated by R, Q respectively. This vector
cannot be extracted from a single HPC count in general (the
example in the last section should be suggestive). However
if the granulation is taken into account, then much more
information (apart from the measure) can be extracted. This
aspect is considered in more detail in a forthcoming paper.
Proposition 2: If gk(Q,R) = (k1, k2, . . . , kr), then
δ(Q,R) =
∑
ki.
The concepts of consistency degrees of multiple models
of knowledge introduced in [22] can also be improved by a
similar strategy:
If δ(Q,R) = a and δ(R,Q) = b, then the consistency
degree of Q and R, Cons(Q,R) is defined by
Cons(Q,R) =
a+ b+ nab
n+ 2
,
where n is the consistency constant. With larger values of n,
the value of the consistency degree becomes smaller.
Definition 5: If gk(Q,R) = (k1, k2, . . . , kr) and
gk(R,Q) = (l1, l2, . . . , lp) then the granular consistency
degree gCons(Q,R) of the knowledge represented by Q,R,
will be
gCons(Q,R) = (k∗1 , . . . , k
∗
r , l
∗
1, . . . , l
∗
p, nk
∗
1 l1, . . . nk
∗
r lp),
where k∗i = kin+2 for i = 1, . . . , r and l
∗
j =
lj
n+2
for j =
1, . . . , p.
The knowledge interpretation can be extended in a natu-
ral way to other general RST (including TAS) and also to
choice inclusive rough semantics [1]. Construction of similar
measures is however work in progress. With respect to the
counting procedures defined, these two general measures are
relatively constructive provided granules can be extracted. This
is possible in many of the cases and not always. They can be
replaced by a technique of defining atomic sub-measures based
on counts and subsequently combining them. These aspects
will be taken up in a future paper.
A. ROUGH INCLUSION FUNCTIONS
Various rough inclusion and membership functions with
related concepts of degrees are known in the literature (see
[23] and references therein). If these are not representable in
terms of granules through term operations formed from the
basic ones ( [1]), then they are not truly functions/degrees of
the rough domain. To emphasize this aspect, I will refer to such
measures as being non-compliant for the rough context. I seek
to replace such non-compliant measures by tuples satisfying
the criteria. Based on this heuristic, I would replace the rough
inclusion function
k(X,Y ) =


#(X ∩ Y )
#(X)
, if X 6= ∅
1, else
with
k∗(X,Y ) =


(y1, y2, . . . , yr) if X
l 6= ∅,(
1
r
, . . . ,
1
r
)
, else
where
#(Gi) · χi(X ∩ Y )
#(X l) = yi
, i = 1, 2, . . . r.
Here it is assumed that {G1, . . . , Gr} = G (the collection
of granules) and that the function χi is being defined via,
χi(X) =
{
1, ifGi ⊆ X
0, else
Similarly,
k1(X,Y ) =


#(Y )
#(X ∪ Y )
, if X ∪ Y 6= ∅
1, else
can be replaced by
k∗1(X,Y ) =
{
(h1, h2, . . . , hr) ifX
l 6= ∅,(
1
r
, . . . , 1
r
)
, else
where
#(Gi) · χi(Y )
#((X ∪ Y )l)
= hi ; i = 1, 2, ..., r
and
k2(X,Y ) =
#(Xc ∪ Y )
#(S)
can be replaced by
k∗2(X,Y ) = (q1, q2, . . . , qr) ,
where
#(G1) · χ1(Xc ∪ Y )
#(S)
= qi, i = 1, 2, . . . , r.
This strategy can be extended to every other non-compliant
inclusion function. Addition, multiplication and their partial
inverses for natural numbers can be properly generalised to
the new types of numbers with special regard to meaning of
the operations on elements of dissimilar type. This paves the
way for the representation of these general measures in the
new number systems (given the granulation).
V. ON REPRESENTATION OF COUNTS
In this section, ways of extending the representation of the
different types of counts considered in the previous section
are touched upon. The basic aim is to endow these with more
algebraic structure through higher order constructions. These
also correspond to rather superfluous implicit interpretations
of counting exact objects by natural numbers.
Consider the following set of statements:
A Set S has finite cardinality n.
B Set S can be counted in n! ways.
C The set of countings C(S) of the set S has cardinality
n!.
E The set of countings C(S) of the set S bijectively
corresponds to the permutation group Sn.
F The set of countings C(S) can be endowed with a
group operation so that it becomes isomorphic to Sn.
Statements C, E and F are rarely explicitly stated or used
in mathematical practice in the stated form. To prove ’F’, it
suffices to fix an initial counting. From the point of view of
information content it is obvious that A ⊂ B ⊂ C ⊂ E ⊂ F .
It is also possible to replace ’set’ in the above statements by
’collection’ and then from the axiomatic point of statements
C, E, and F will require stronger axioms (This aspect will
not be taken up in the present paper). I will show that partial
algebraic variants of statement F correspond to IPC.
An important aspect that will not carry over under the
generalisation is:
Proposition 3: Case F is fully determined by any of the two
element generating sets (for finite n).
A. Representation Of IPC
The group Sn can be associated with all the usual counting
of a collection of n elements. The composition operation can
be understood as the action of one counting on another. This
group can be associated with the RYS being counted and
’similarly counted pairs’ in the latter can be used to generate a
partial algebra. Formally, the structure will be deduced using
knowledge of Sn and then abstracted:
• Form the group Sn with operation ∗ based on the inter-
pretation of the collection as a finite set of n elements at
a higher meta level
• Using the information about similar pairs, associate a
second interpretation s(x) based on the IPC procedure
with each element x ∈ Sn
• Define (x, y) ∈ ρ if and only if s(x) = s(y)
On the quotient Sn|ρ, let
a⊙ b =
{
c if {z : x ∗ y = z, x ∈ a, y ∈ b}|ρ ∈ Sn|ρ
∞ else
The following proposition follows from the form of the
definition.
Proposition 4: The partial operation ⊙ is well defined.
Definition 6: A partial algebra of the form 〈Sn|ρ, ⊙〉 de-
fined above will be called a Concrete IPC-partial Algebra
(CIPCA)
A partially ordered set 〈F,≤〉 is a lower semi-linearly
ordered set if and only if:
• For each x, x ↓ is linearly ordered.
• (∀x, y)(∃z)z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y
It is easy to see that IPC counts form lower semi-linearly
ordered sets. Structures of these types and properties of their
automorphisms are all of interest and will be considered in a
separate paper.
VI. FURTHER DIRECTIONS: CONCLUSION
The broad classes of problems that will be part of future
work fall under:
• Improvement of the representation of different classes of
countings. The main questions relate to using morphisms
or automorphisms in a more streamlined way.
• More results on identification of granules and definite
elements from dialectical counting.
• Description of other semantics of general RST in terms
of counts. This is the basic program of representing all
types of general rough semantics in terms of counts.
• Can the division operation be eliminated in the general
measures proposed? In other words, a more natural
extensions of fractions (rough rationals) would be of
much interest. Obviously this is part of the representation
problem for counts.
• How do algorithms for reduct computation get affected
by the generalised measures?
Apart from these a wide variety of combinatorial questions
would be of natural interest.
Originally the presented rough natural number systems had
been developed by the present author in conjunction with an
axiomatic theory of granules for a much broader programme
in the foundations of rough and fuzzy set theories in a separate
research paper. The present paper is an adaptation of the
number system for generalised measures.
In this research paper, new methods of counting collections
of well defined and indiscernible objects have been advanced
with limited use of the axiomatic theory of granules. These
new methods of counting have been shown to be applicable
to the extension of fundamental measures of RST, rough
inclusion measures and consistency degrees of knowledge. The
redefined measures possess more information than the original
measures and have more realistic orientation with respect to
counting.
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